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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
which is more flexible and which can with ease resolve the problem.
However, with the continuing and growing necessity for a more
equitable solution to the problem in the absence of legislative
action, the court, may eliminate the presumption of immunity which
it has established thus following the Minnesota example.
THEODORE ABE
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-EXECUTION OF WAR-
RANTS-LIMITATIONS ON OFFICERS EXECUTING A WARRANT-The de-
fendant was suspected of bookmaking. Two county detectives in
plain clothes, armed with two search warrants and one arrest war-
rant, approached his home, knocked once on the door, waited about
a minute and, after receiving no response from within, began to
apply a crowbar to the door The defendant opened the door before
they proceeded any further, and they were allowed a peaceable
entry Subsequently the detectives identified themselves and read
the warrants. Upon searching the premises they found and confis-
cated several blank sheets of paper and two newspapers containing
horseracing forms. During this time they answered phone calls
for the defendant in which the callers wished to place bets on horses.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, with two judges dissenting,'
affirmed a conviction for setting up a gambling establishment and
for bookmaking, while denying the defendant's contention that the
evidence obtained in the search was inadmissible due to the detec-
tives' failure to announce their purpose and authority prior to forcible
entry The court said that the defendant opened the door volun-
tarily and entry was therefore gained peaceably Thus the ensuing
search was lawful and the evidence obtained therefrom was admis-
sible. Commonwealth v Ametrane, 422 Pa. 83, 221 A.2d 296 (1966)
The present case raises a question as to the extent that law
enforcement officers may go and yet remain within established
boundaries of lawful searches and seizures carried out under a
warrant. With regard to the instant case it has been held that the
execution of a warrant is lawful if entry is peaceful and there is
no breaking of parts of the house.2 The defendant here did allow
the officers to enter peacefully, although the results of the ensuing
1. Eagen and Musmanno, J. Musmanno dissented strongly, stating that never before
has he felt It more necessary to write a dissenting opinion. He said that entry under
such condition was illegal, "as if without encountering resistance the officers had reduced
the door to splinters." He went on to say that the evidence should have been suppressed
not only because of illegal entry, but because the search warrants were not issued upon
probable cause.
2. United States v. Bowman, 137 F.Supp. 385 (D.D.C, 1956).
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search conceivably would have been different had he delayed a bit
longer and the officers had proceeded to break down his door
Many jurisdictions 3  including North Dakota,4 have statutes
which provide that an officer may break a door or window to gain
entry to the premises in pursuance of executing a valid warrant
only after first announcing his authority and purpose, and there-
after being denied admittance. Silence or lack of response has been
held to constitute a denial' A discrepancy had previously existed
between those jurisdictions with such statute and those which had
no provisions for announcement prior to forcible entry 6 Before
the Supreme Court's historic pronouncement in Mapp v Ohio7 in
1961. This discrepancy centered around the admissibility of evidence
produced by an unlawful search. Even courts in jurisdiction swith
announcement statutes had at times held that such evidence was
admissible," and North Dakota was among these. 9
Subsequent to the Mapp decision however, the courts are pre-
sumed to apply federal standards for admissible evidence in state
cases when a question of the legality of seized evidence arises.10
Thus, states such as Maryland,11 which previously had no statute
specifically covering announcement of authority and purpose, now
have a standard which they should apply The federal statute12 re-
quires announcement prior to forcible entry in the execution of a
valid warrant. Federal courts have held that failure to do so will
taint the search and the evidence which is the product of that
search.'s
There are three major exceptions to the rule of announcement. 14
The first is that notice is not necessary when persons inside already
know of the officer's authority and purpose. 15 The second is when
officers reasonably believe that persons inside are in peril.16 The
third exists when officers have reason to believe that announcement
3. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 844, 1531 (1956) MONT. REv. CODES ANN. Hi 94-6011,
94-301-9 (1947) N.Y. Con CRM. PRoC. § 175 (1958), § 799 (1966) S.D. CODE §§ 34.1606
(1939).
4. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-06-14, 29-29-08 (1960).
5. See generally, United States v. Viale, 312 F.2d. 595 (2nd. Cir. 1963) Sykes v.
United States, 312 F.2d. 232 (8th Cir. 1963), United States v. Whiting, 311 F.2d. 191
(4th Cir. 1962).
6. See Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlwwful Entry Miller v. United
States and Ker v. Californta, 112 U. of PENN. L. REv., 560-61 (1964)
7. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8. E.g., People v. Maddox, 46 Cal.2d 301, 294 P.2d.. 6 (1965) Strader v. Common.
wealth, 302 Ky. 330, 194 S.W.2d 368 (1946) Condra v. Anderson, 254 S.W.2d 528 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1953).
9. State v. Fahn, 53 N.D. 203, 205 N.W 67 (1925).
10. Supra., note 7.
11. Frankel V. State, 178 Md. 553, 16 A.2d. 93 (1940).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1958).
13. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1958) United States ex. rel. Man-
duchi v. Tracy 350 F.2d. 658, 662 (3rd Cir. 1965) , Woods v. United States, 240 F.2d. 37
(D.C. Cir. 1956).
14. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963).
15. Miller v. United States, supra note 13 People v. Maddox, supra note 8 People
V. Martin, 45 Cal.2d. 755, 290 P.2d. 855 (1965).
16. Supra note 14.
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would enable susptects to destroy or dispose of sought-after evi-
dence.17 Evidence produced by the search will usually be admissible
in the courts if one of these exceptions has presented itself.,8
Courts have purposely avoided attempts to define the constituent
elements of an unreasonable search by stating that each case will
be decided with regard to the facts and circumstances particular
to it.19 The North Dakota policy seems to be this.20 Decisions
have provided some guidelines, however, as to which objects seized
will or will not be admissible as evidence. "Mere evidence" is not
substantial in itself.21 It must appear that the article seized played
a significant role in the alleged crime,2 2 although what would be
called "mere evidence" has been termed by at least one court as
"instrumentality" and thus the lawful object of a search.2 3
It has also been held that evidence will be inadmissible if a
warrant has not been issued upon "probable cause." ' 2' North Dakota
has a statute requiring probable cause as a prerequisite to the
issuance of a valid warrant. 25 This has been further clarified by
the court by stating that even though officers have a valid warrant
for arrest, it may not be used as a mere pretext to search for
evidence.
26
The boundaries within which officers executing a warrant in
North Dakota are confined to has been fairly integrated into the
above discussion. Evidence which prior to the Mapp decision would
have been admissible in North Dakota courts, but inadmissible ac-
17. United States v. Fair, 176 F.Supp. 571, 574 (D.D.C. 1959) People v. Hammond.
9 Cal. Rptr. 238, 357 P.2d 289, 294 (1960) , People v. Russell, 223 Cal. App.2d 733, 36
Cal. Rptr. 27 (1964).
18. Supra notes 15, 16, 17. It is worthy to note here that New York amended their
announcement statute for the execution of search warrants in 1964 to provide that entry
may be made forcefully "without notice of his authority and purpose If the judge, justice,
or magistrate issuing the warrant has inserted a direction therein that the officer executing
it shall not be required to give such notice. The judge, justice, or magistrate may so
direct only upon proof under oath, to his satisfaction, that the property sought may be
easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of, or that danger to the life or limb of the
officer or another may result, if such notice were to be given." N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §
799(b) (1966). Such a provision deserves legislative consideration in North Dakota, for
It would ease somewhat the present restrictions on officers with regard to this area of
the law.
19. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) Kelly v. United States, 197 F.2d 162
(5th Cir. 1952).
20. State v. Chaussee, 138 N.W.2d 788, 792 (N.D. 1965).
21. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), despite criticism to the contrary
(intra, note 23) the appellate jurisdictions follow this decision as excluding mere evidence.
See, Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1966), Golliher v. United States,
362 F.2d 594, 600 (8th Cir. 1966). In Golliher the court countered such criticism by stating
that there is a very narrow and hazy line between that which is "mere evidence" and that
which is an "instrumentality" and that continued stretching of the word "instrumentality"
could reach the level of absurdity. It did however, recognize some of the criticism as valid.
22. United States v. Stern, 225 F.Supp. 187, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
23. People v. Thayer, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 408 P.2d 108 (1965). Justice Traynor here
surveys the mere evidence rule and concludes that It is not a federal and constitutional
standard and says further that even If it were It would not require the exclusion from
evidence of medical records involvitd In this case because they were clearly Instruments
of the crime.
24. Goodman v. State, 178 Md. 1, 11 A.2d 635 (1940).
25. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-03 (1960).
26. State v. Govan, 123 N.W.2d 110 (N.D. 1963).
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cording to federal standards,21 now must be the product of a lawful
search. This was articulated recently in State v Manning.2 Thus,
North Dakota has at present reasonably defined the procedure for
the lawful execution of a warrant and the admissibility of evidence
obtained therefrom by means of statutes and court decisions. Strict
guidelines have not been formally pronounced, since our courts are
in accord with other jurisdictions, which hold that each case will
be decided on its particular facts 29 subsequent to conformity with
the essential statutory requirements.
ROBERT BRADY
BASTARDY-PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY-SUFFICIENCY-EXCLU-
SIONARY BLOOD TESTs-Petitioner was seeking support for her
three children. Defendant denied responsibility for support of the
youngest child on the grounds that he was not the father, and re-
quested a blood grouping test pursuant to section 418 of The Family
Court Act. Petitioner, respondent and the child were tested. The
results indicated that the respondent should be excluded as the father
of the child. Petitioner's attorney conceded that the doctor who
conducted the test was one of the foremost serologists and hema-
tologists in the country and an expert in blood grouping tests. The
court pointed out that in questions of paternity an exclusion is con-
vincing proof that the respondant is not the father of the child born
out of wedlock. But, when a child is born in wedlock the presumption
of legitimacy is one of the strongest presumptions in law and re-
quires more than a fair preponderance of evidence to overcome the
presumption. The court must be entirely satisfied that the alleged
father is not a parent of the child. Held, the presumption of legiti-
macy of a child born in wedlock had been overcome by the exclusion-
ary results of the blood grouping test. Crouse v Crouse, 273 N.Y.S.
2d 595 (1966)
The presumption that a child born in wedlock is legitimate is
a strong presumption founded in early common law I Early English
law said that if the husband, not physically incapable, was within
27. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914). The Supreme Court excluded from consideration by federal courts of any
and all evidence illegally seized by federal officer.
28. 134 N.W.2d 91 (N.D. 1965).
29. Gouled v. United States, supra note 21 McKnight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977
(D.C. Cir. 1950).
1. Bayne v. Willard, 261 N.Y.S.2d 793, 796 (1965.) Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62
So.2d 119, 121 (1952) Holder v. Holder, 9 Utah 2d 163, 340 P.2d 761-62 (1959) In re
Findlay, 170 N.E. 471-72 (Ct. App. 1930) Hargrave v. Hargrave, 9 Bev. 555, 50 Etig.
Rep. 457, 458 (1864).
